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Abstract Popular misconceptions about the danger of madness have undermined 
mentally ill people’s struggle for social inclusion. Consequently, efforts to think 
through how we might belong together must take account of mental patients’ right to 
a public voice. However, the article takes issue with an excessively cognitive and 
rationalistic conception of the public citizen. It suggests, instead, that ‘alternative’ 
forums can be constructed which counters the dominant cultural image of the “mad, 
crazy, nutter”. It concludes by discussing one innovative TV series (Video Diaries) in 
which ‘mentally ill’ participants’ reveal their capacity to speak for themselves.  
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Introduction  
On New Year’s Eve 1992, visitors to the lion enclosure in London Zoo were alarmed 
to see a young man climb over the safety barrier∗. Despite urgent appeals for him to 
return to the safety of the viewing area he walked calmly towards the lions, knelt, and 
was then attacked. The man, Ben Silcock, survived though surgery to repair the 
damage took many hours. The drama of his mauling, captured on video by an amateur 
camcorder enthusiast, was later aired by all the main British TV news organizations. 
The newsworthiness of the incident was added to when it transpired that Silcock was 
a diagnosed schizophrenic and the previous day had asked for, but been denied, 
admission to hospital. He had apparently recognised that his psychotic symptoms 
were worsening and had sought emergency treatment. However, rather like the 
character Yossarian in Joseph Heller’s Catch 22, medical staff at the hospital felt that 
                                                 
∗ I am grateful to Graham Murdock for comments on earlier versions of this article.  
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Silcock’s request was itself evidence that he was not a suitable case for urgent 
treatment.  
 
The footage of Silcock’s mauling was deeply disturbing and in Britain quickly came 
to symbolise the violence associated with closing traditional asylums. But in the 
aftermath of recriminations and explanations it was never made clear why he chose to 
enter the lion’s den (aside from popular explanations that “he must be mad”). In a 
television interview sometime after the event, he spoke of how he often visited the 
zoo because he felt a particular communion with the caged lions. His father, Brian, 
commented that living as a mental patient in the community was akin to being an 
unwelcome guest at a party to which he was not invited and suggested that his son felt 
more at home in the company of wild animals than people.  
 
Nearly a decade later, the symbolism of Silcock’s mauling continues to carry two 
meanings. It remains a cause celebre for those who maintain that the care in the 
community policy is not working. But it also suggests the immense difficulty that the 
mentally ill encounter in forging a sense of belonging in a world that wishes they 
were elsewhere.  
 
Inclusion and Exclusion  
The notion that the mentally ill do not ‘belong’ is embedded in the popular lexicon of 
mental disorder: “barmy”, “batty”, “crazy”, “demented”, “loony”, “mad”, “nutter”, 
“psycho”, “wacky”, “zany”. This insistent vocabulary of difference marks out the vast 
gulf between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It drives home the strangeness, the remoteness, above 
all the ‘otherness’ of mental disorder. The inclusive vision of community care policy 
 4
therefore has to contend with deeply ingrained notions that the mentally ill are not 
normal, that they are different. As one British mental health service user recently put 
it, ‘It is easier to live in society with a prison record than a psychiatric record’ (Mind, 
1999: 6).  
 
Barham and Hayward (1991: 137) interviewed mentally ill people living in Britain to 
explore their experiences of life after the asylum. Speaking about the social impact of 
his particular psychiatric diagnosis, Henry, observes that ‘with schizophrenia you’re 
not living, you’re just existing... I think that schizophrenia will always make me a 
second-class citizen’. His assertion is based on an experience of boredom and 
demoralisation following release from hospital. His situation is such that he feels he 
does not belong in the world of ‘normal’ people. This sense of exclusion is frequently 
reinforced by local hostility to having mental health facilities located in residential 
neighbourhoods (Sayce, 1995).  
 
The tension generated by the encounter between ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ 
individuals illustrates how far communal solidarity with the mentally ill is vulnerable 
to moral judgements about ‘the responsible self’. This tension governs our policy goal 
to fashion the mentally ill as people like ourselves, equal members of our political 
community, whilst at the same time ensuring that their apparent difference from ‘us’ - 
their irrationality - is dealt with at the pharmacological level1. In other words, if 
mentally ill people are given civil rights then we can expect certain responsibilities 
from them; they must act responsibly and take prescribed medication.  
 
                                                 
1 A proposed new Mental Health Act for England and Wales will construct non-compliance with a drug 
regime in the community as an offence. At present compulsory treatment requires hospitalization.  
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The Silence of Madness 
Foucault (1987) has argued that the literal ‘shutting up’ of the insane in institutions 
has silenced madness. This has led to an extraordinary deafness towards the 
communications of the disturbed, and in particular a discounting of the reactions to, 
and complaints against, the treatment meted out to them. Inmates were all too aware 
of how the power dynamic inside the asylum obscured their point of view - a fact 
wryly noted by the Restoration playwright Nathaniel Lee, following his committal to 
Bethlem Hospital in the late sixteenth century: ‘They called me mad, I called them 
mad, and damn them they outvoted me’ (Quoted in Porter, 1991: 1). 
 
What the asylum system produced, then, was not merely confinement for large 
numbers of people but a whole way of seeing and understanding irrationality at the 
individual level. Foucault shows how the ‘great confinement’ of the mad gathering 
pace since the Seventeenth Century resulted in a modern system of social exclusion in 
which the voice of the mental patient is ignored as rank nonsense. In Britain, for 
example, this has historically meant that some patients detained in mental hospitals 
have been denied the right to vote in elections.  
 
Institutional segregation has been replaced by care in the community. Yet the official 
medico-psychiatric language for managing the mad continues to decide ‘where and 
how they can participate in the lives of those deemed to be of full mental health’ 
(Adam Phillips, 2001: 36). In considering the recovery of the mental patient’s ‘place’ 
in the community, Glass writes that ‘the medical language that exercises such a 
powerful hold over the patient’s sense of identity and liberty, reinforces the self’s 
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knowledge of its own separateness, its essential and abiding alienation from the 
species, from community’ (Quoted in Barham, 1997: 170).  
 
Expanding citizenship’s vocabulary in order to communicate with the mad (Hickman, 
1996) is vital if we are to find a way of belonging together. However, mental patients’ 
struggle for inclusion has not figured in recent ‘recognition’ work promoting a revised 
ethos of citizenship grounded in the deconstruction of ‘otherness’ and recognising 
difference (see, for instance, the recent special edition on ‘recognition and difference’ 
in Theory, Culture and Society, April, 2001). While mental patients are the archetypal 
‘other - representatives par excellence of the non-normal – their marginalization is 
mirrored in the current politics of recognition which prefers to elevate racial, ethnic, 
and gender marginalization over the cultural politics of mental health.  
 
Madness and Cultural Recognition  
With the closure of Britain’s Victorian-built asylums, mental patients have reappeared 
as familiar figures on our streets and in other public spaces. However, the cultural 
image of the mentally ill as “mad, bad and dangerous to know” has simultaneously 
reinforced their ‘otherness’ and grounded it in everyday experience. As Anne Phillips 
(1999: 81) puts it, in the context of arguments about equal human worth, ‘it is 
proximity to those different from ourselves that resurrects long-buried ideas about 
social superiority and social inferiority, and that it is easy to conceive of others as 
your equals when you are not exposed to the details of their lives’. Recognizing 
mentally ill people’s humanity easily dissolves in the face of recalcitrant experience.  
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Perhaps we should not be surprised. As Barham (1984: 178) reminds us, ‘we err if we 
suppose that administrative changes in the form of the transfer of those people from 
one category of sites to another necessarily indicate a deeper social change in the 
terms on which such people are to be regarded and permitted to participate in social 
life’. Barham’s caution derives from a concern that the blunt reality of care in the 
community falls some way short of the rhetorical promises.  
 
This is not a uniquely British problem. Knowles (2000) has shown how, in the 
absence of welfare provision, homeless schizophrenics in Montreal pass through city 
spaces in which by definition, they can never anchor their lives. Her interviews with 
schizophrenics also reveal how, cut loose from the asylum and the hospital, they 
encounter misconceptions about their condition (that they have a split personality, are 
dangerous, and so on) which are worked into both their own understandings and their 
relations with others: ‘Schizophrenics’ conceptions of madness form a part of the 
public regimes for disposal of private terror. It forms a part of the ways in which they 
walk the streets of the city’ (Knowles, ibid.: 101). In short, madness remains a fixed 
cultural reference point within the political economy of local urban mythology.  
 
Though writing from different geographical and cultural perspectives, Knowles and 
Barham share the view that the mentally ill are denied full inclusion in the social 
community, and pose the challenge of reconstructing social bonds with the mentally 
ill. The extent of the challenge is neatly summed up by Knowles: ‘The mad clearly 
occupy a strategic place in popular public concerns about safety and danger. This 
entails overhauling the existing relationship between the mad and not so mad and 
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rethinking the terms of our mutual existence, something that requires a major shift in 
the ways in which we think about madness’ (Knowles, ibid.: 160).  
 
However, the ways in which we think about madness carry historical weight. Gilman 
(1982) has shown how visual representations in our own era continually draw upon 
conceptualizations of madness from past times. Such continuity of representation, he 
suggests, overrides the banality of real mental illness and helps maintain a symbolic 
barrier between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Following Gilman, a leading mental health advocate, 
Otto Wahl (1995: 114), argues that the ‘creative professionals of today’s media are, in 
some ways, just carrying on traditional depictions of the past. Many of today’s images 
are repetitions or residuals of long-standing popular beliefs’. In his discussion of US 
films involving the mentally ill, for example, he notes how the portrayal of the “mad 
murderer” as looking distinctively different activates artistic conventions that have 
evolved over centuries.  
 
Images of madness are also entrenched in the popular British imagination. In this 
historical and symbolic context, a complex relationship between madness and culture 
has evolved (Porter, 1987; Busfield, 1994; Showalter, 1987) in which representations 
and images of madness are found across a range of legal, medical and literary texts, as 
well as in the visual arts such as painting, film and photography. Over the years, as 
madness gave way to modern notions of ‘mental illness’, psychiatry has been unable 
to distance itself from cultural narratives concerning violent insanity (Wearing, 1993).  
 
For instance, concern about unsupervised mental patients abroad in the community 
has figured prominently in popular UK newspaper accounts of mental illness and 
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crime (Muijen, 1995; Sayce, 1995; Baker and McPherson, 2000). Similarly, public 
fear about mental patients has provided British TV soap writers with a wealth of 
dramatic material (Philo, 1996; Henderson, 1996; Rose, 1998). Major soaps like East 
Enders, Coronation Street and Brookside have each introduced storylines exploring 
the dangerous consequences of caring for mental patients in the community.  
 
Mental Illness and Cultural Rights  
The mythology of violence that underpins popular assumptions about mental illness in 
the community suggests we must confront the cultural legacy of misrecognition in the 
public sphere. The social consequences of misrecognition, as Nancy Fraser (2000: 
113) makes clear, are that people are ‘denied the status of a full partner in social 
interaction, as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value that 
constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem’. In the case of the 
mentally ill, cultural representations which reinforce their marginal status are not only 
antithetical to changed social relations between the mad and not so mad, but also 
undermine their claim to the cultural rights of citizenship.  
 
The concept of cultural rights has evolved as an extension of citizenship rights; that is 
as the most recent set of rights to enable the citizen to be a fully participating member 
of the political community (Turner, 2001; cf. Murdock, 1999). Cultural rights, in this 
sense, offer the prospect of inclusion in the community regardless of cultural identity 
or life style. Recent reassessments of the cultural conditions for citizenship often 
begin with T.H. Marshall’s seminal essay on ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (first 
published in 1950), which took for granted ‘that cultural rights were implicit in civil 
and social rights’ (Roche, 2001: 76). However, such a view overlooks the role of 
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media in constructing (and delineating) membership of the political community. 
Consequently, the concept of cultural rights points to the symbolic mechanisms by 
which cultural belonging and recognition are facilitated.  
 
Cultural rights, according to Pakulski (1997: 80), herald a ‘new set of citizenship 
claims that involve the right to unhindered and legitimate representation, and 
propagation of identities and lifestyles through the information systems’. The framing 
of cultural rights in terms of rights of cultural citizenship points not only to the 
recognition of difference, but the further unversalizing of citizenship. In other words, 
cultural rights provide a bridge to a second aspect of recognition demands; ‘that is for 
recognition of the common humanity of different groups and the equal worth of each 
citizen, which flows from that’ (Lister, 2001: 100; emphasis in the original).  
 
Pakulski’s notion of cultural rights involves three sub-elements: ‘the right to symbolic 
presence and visibility (vs marginalization); the right to dignifying representation (vs 
stigmatisation); and the right to propagation of identity and maintenance of lifestyles 
(vs assimilation)’ (Pakulski, 1997: 80). These rights centre upon the role of cultural 
institutions in strengthening (or undermining) symbolic ties of citizenship. As 
Stevenson (1999: 59) puts it: ‘To talk of cultural citizenship… is to be concerned with 
the various ways in which membership is both determined and constructed. Are you 
an insider or an outsider, accepted or rejected, embraced or shunned by contemporary 
society?’ These questions are not simply academic; in the context of shifting politics 
of mental health care they pose substantial practical difficulties for the mentally ill.  
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The reorganisation of mental health services from asylum to care in the community 
challenges prevailing attitudes toward the mentally ill in two ways. Firstly, it 
acknowledges the cultural rights of the stigmatised. In the case of the mentally ill, this 
involves rights of access to a public voice. Secondly, and related to the latter point, 
the deconstruction of the mentally ill ‘other’ is essential to re-valuing their lives, 
helping them forge empathetic relations with others. This is valuable in helping 
members of the community understand that the ‘otherness’ of mental illness does not 
belong ‘elsewhere’, nor does it entail irretrievable differences of identity between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. Indeed, given that mental health problems affect one in four people in 
Britain (and 450 million people worldwide), it underscores that ‘they’ are also ‘us’.  
 
Mental Patients and the Public Sphere 
The advent of community care appears as a particularly helpful context in which to 
promote mentally ill people’s emergence into the public sphere. Free of the asylum, 
so the argument goes, they can participate in public discourse on equal terms with 
others in order to offer alternative accounts of their condition. But this ideal speech 
situation borrows heavily from a Habermas-inspired view of public discourse. It 
presupposes that the mentally ill will encounter no difficulties in entering a discursive 
space predicated on rational debate. Here, the point is that Habermas’s emphasis upon 
the rational character of communication compounds mentally ill people’s difficulties 
in taking up rights of participation in the public sphere.  
 
Feminist critiques of Habermas’s classic public sphere model argue that his masculine 
dissociation from the feminine reproduces a public world devoid of emotion and 
affect (e.g. Fraser, 1987). This criticism points to the way in which prevailing 
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relations between reason and emotion structure rights of participation in the public 
sphere. Other critics have questioned the dominance of the rationalist voice on the 
grounds that ‘[t]he Enlightenment, in promoting the hope of universal reason, silenced 
those whose voices were considered unreasonably emotional, superstitious or old-
fashioned’ (Billig, 1996: 12). Post-modern celebrations of ‘Otherness’ have helped 
reinstate these maligned voices. It would be a mistake however, to think that every 
voice suppressed by the dominant voice of western rationalism has been rescued.  
 
Despite the apparent multivocality of post-modernism, certain subjects (and 
subjectivities) remain marginalized and subject to censure by ‘rational’ society. One 
group for whom this is a continuing problem are voice hearers. As Blackman (2000: 
57) makes clear: ‘The hearing of voices is a signifier of deficit, disease, pathology, 
and lack, indicating that a person has lost certain psychological propensities and is 
unable to function as a responsible citizen’. At the very least, one can imagine how 
people who hear voices might be wary of drawing attention to their experiences.  
 
The Politics of Voice Hearing 
However, the decline in the pre-eminent position of the asylum has seen a shift in the 
discursive field around mental health. Thus, for example, the Hearing Voices Network 
(HVN), a growing international network of self-help groups for voice hearers, argue 
that voice hearing is misunderstood by psychiatry which denies the reality of their 
hearing experiences (see Coleman, 1999). Consequently, the HVN offer an counter-
space in which hearers ‘can adopt different relations to their voices producing very 
different ways of being, thinking and acting’ (Blackman, 2001: 189).  
 
 13
The HVN places particular emphasis on hearers retrieving the personal meaning their 
voices may have. The approach is one of challenging orthodox psychiatry by working 
with hearers to listen to, contextualise, and then integrate the significance of their 
hearing experiences within the tapestry of their own lives. As the authors of the 
network’s self-help manual, Working With Voices, put it: ‘It is important to see 
yourself as an individual rooted in society and not as a patient rooted in psychiatry’ 
(Coleman and Smith, quoted in Blackman, 2001: 200).  
 
At the heart of the HVN enterprise is an opportunity for voice hearers to understand 
their experiences on their own terms. In doing so, the network encourages hearers to 
vocalise ways in which psychiatry has misrecognised their hearing experiences and 
concomitantly helped reinforced the cultural image of the “mad, crazy nutter”. 
However, while the self-help organization of the network means that voice hearers are 
able to share their hearing experiences between each other, the question remains as to 
how voice hearers can add their experiences to the stock of available reality?  
 
Recognition and Representation  
This is a deceptively simple question. Within the paternalistic ethos of British public-
service broadcasting, for example, people who hear voices have been constructed as 
one more ‘social problem’. From an early point in its history in Britain, radio and later 
television opened itself to a range of popular voices but this did not include the mad. 
The locked doors of the asylum marked the symbolic boundary between rationality 
and derangement, intelligible speech and sensible utterance. Mental illness, if it was 
spoken about at all, was debated by experts and addressed by government policies.  
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However, the shift from asylums to community care has coincided, in Britain, with 
major changes in the television system. The emergence of a ‘new populism’ in 
documentary and current affairs programmes in the 1990s has led to a decentring of 
expertise and an emphasis on common sense and grounded experience (Livingstone 
and Lunt, 1994). The arrival of populist TV means that marginalized voices have been 
granted more extensive access opportunities to speak about their experiences than in 
varieties of paternalism associated with the ethos of public service (Corner, 1994).  
 
The breakdown of the paternalist tradition has resulted in accusations that the public 
sphere is collapsing under the weight of emotionality and affect (see Dahlgren, 1995). 
However, this need not be the case if we imagine forms of arational public discourse 
that do not assume an excessively cognitive and rationalistic conception of the ‘public 
citizen’. Indeed, affect and emotionality, far from denigrating the public sphere, might 
contribute to understanding as to why we should actually care about others. This leads 
us to consider one documentary series which marries interest in ‘others’ with 
recognition of the other’s right to speak for themselves in public.  
 
Video Diaries: ‘Mad, Bad or Sad?’  
In the BBC series Video Diaries, individuals with a story to tell are first selected and 
then issued with a camcorder to record events in their own lives. Diarists then edit the 
tapes in consultation with BBC professionals. The resulting programmes are then 
broadcast on the national network. The series aims (in theory) to empower the diarist 
by mobilising their experientially based vision of the world within a format that 
supports their capacity to speak for themselves (Dinsmore, 1996; cf. Dovey, 2000). 
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The series’ format allows viewers a privileged and unique mode of access to a degree 
of subjectivity unimaginable in traditional documentary modes of expression.  
 
‘Mad, Bad or Sad?’2 is Sharon’s video diary about being a black schizophrenic 
woman living in Manchester, England. A key figure in her diary is Mickey, Sharon’s 
husband, also a schizophrenic. Together, they offer a deeply personal perspective on 
the experience of hearing voices and being labelled ‘schizophrenic’. Consider, for 
example, Sharon’s opening address to viewers:  
 
 You probably don’t think you’ll crack up. The chances are you might then 
you’d be a nutter like me. A doctor will give you a label that sticks to you for 
the rest of your life. Mine was schizophrenic. Making this diary was hard, 
sharing all my secrets, but I really wanted you to see me, the person I am 
behind the label. Most of my life I’ve spent in institutions, until I met Mickey. 
He’s a schizophrenic too. Now we live together in Manchester - me, Mickey, 
my two cats and my voices. I hear voices, echoes from my past. This is the 
root of my madness.  
 
This perfectly illustrates the remit of Video Diaries: to allow ordinary people to tell 
their own stories in a way that gives us insights into the ‘reality’ of their situation. 
Sharon’s story is one of being permanently marked by the label ‘schizophrenic’. 
Watching her ‘diary’ however, we are not asked to distance ourselves from her but to 
identify. We are offered a sense of intimate engagement with the otherness being 
portrayed. Sharon’s narration draws us into her personal world of ‘Mickey, my two 
                                                 
2 Broadcast, 25th April 1995.  
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cats and my voices’. The subjective camera and first-person voice-over, allow us to 
view the world entirely through Sharon’s eyes. This process may have been ‘hard’, 
but it enables her to explain the ‘root’ of her madness from within her own life-world 
perspective.  
 
The argument, alluded to earlier, that the mentally ill are in the community but are not 
part of the community, lies at the heart of Sharon and Mickey’s story. In the following 
testimony, Mickey speaks both authoritatively and emotionally about his experience 
of living and coping with a mental illness diagnosis:  
 Some people would say you live the life of bloody Riley because you get that 
little bit extra, cos you’re on the sick, rather than just being unemployed. But 
there’s a price to pay. I mean, if you end up in the loony bin you know 
somewhere in your head that you’re being talked about, ‘cos you know that 
when you were out there before you got that label, well you were one of them. 
You’d be talking about people. You’d be saying, “oh, such and such is in the 
loony bin”, you know, “a right nutter”. I mean if you were to mention it to 
your shrink he’d probably say you were paranoid! But I know. I know what 
we used to say about people and I know the jokes that were made. And 
consequently, I know the jokes that are made about me and Sharon.  
Here, Mickey expresses his dislike for the mental illness label based on his pre-illness 
experience of judging people according to their status as a mental patient. His candid 
testimony draws on the popular terminology used to marginalize and exclude the 
mentally ill. Instead of avoiding derogatory words such as “nutter” and “loony bin” 
however, he deliberately appropriates them in order to contest the validity of such 
(mis)representations. Moreover, by playing with the ‘shrink/paranoid’ joke he signals 
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how his own pre-illness attitude towards the mentally ill impacts on his present 
schizophrenic identity. He is talking to viewers as a ‘schizophrenic’, but also as 
someone ingrained within a culture that sees schizophrenics as different. The 
deficiency of the schizophrenic (“a right nutter... ”) is turned on its head and becomes 
the deficiency of society; one that fails to recognise their humanity. As his testimony 
concludes, the image track cuts to a shot of Sharon asleep. The image of normality 
this conveys adds to the poignancy of Mickey’s acknowledgement that others see 
them as a joke. The message appears to be: “There but for the grace of God go I”.  
 
Making Madness Visible  
The marginalization of the mentally ill seems likely to become one of the main issues 
for recognition politics over the next few years. In Britain, some psychiatric service 
users are adopting tactics of past civil rights movements. For example, the Chair of a 
user-led campaign group, Survivors Speak Out, signs his letters Glad to be Mad – just 
as gays reclaimed the word ‘queer’. He has also set about organizing a Mad Pride 
Rally, modelled on Gay Pride. ‘All this happened while the rest of us have been stuck 
in the old thinking about nutters and weirdoes. The lunatics have not yet taken over 
the asylum – but they are raising their voice’ (Freedland, 1998: 28).  
 
The anger of service users is driving demands for an end to the discrimination of the 
mentally ill. However, the notion that mental patients are incapable of giving a valid 
viewpoint is often enough to ensure their marginalization from more ‘rational’ forms 
of public discourse. Their vulnerability to the image of the “mad, crazy, nutter” is a 
form of censorship and silencing. This means that participation in the community for 
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those currently constituted as mentally ill must be guaranteed through the provision of 
cultural rights of citizenship, including rights to a public voice.  
 
But as the argument above suggests, the terms on which the mentally ill should be 
given a public voice raise particularly awkward issues. With the advent of the care in 
the community policy, there is a blurred distinction as to the criteria we might adopt 
in taking mental patients’ views seriously. In the case of voice hearers, for example, 
their right to speak about their hearing experiences can easily be countered with the 
claim that what they are saying is evidence they are “unwell”. This reproduction of a 
medicalized way of seeing and understanding ‘the mad’ under a new set of conditions 
may well turn out to be psychiatry’s most potent legacy.  
 
Final Remark  
In Britain, the mental health field is currently experiencing winds of change. Various 
interest groups are gathering in order to stake out their vision of future psychiatric 
policy. Between incarceration in ‘secure’ environments and the relative ‘freedom’ of 
community care, a repertoire of professional and lay voices are engaging in a struggle 
to be seen and heard. Without closing the cultural gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
mentally ill people’s mode of belonging is provisional and subject to the machinations 
of those who would (re-)impose citizenship’s exclusivity. It remains an open question 
as to whether the grainy video images of Ben Silcock’s fateful visit to London Zoo 
will be a lasting memorial to our failure to find a way to belong together.  
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